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Abstract:  
Several measures of partisan bias are reviewed for single 
member districts with two dominant parties.  These include 
variants of the simple bias that considers only deviation of 
seats from 50% at statewide 50% vote. Also included are 
equalization of losing votes and equalization of wasted votes, 
both of which apply directly when the statewide vote is not 50% 
and which require, not just partisan symmetry, but specific 
forms of the seats-votes curve.  A new measure of bias is 
introduced, based on the geometric area between the seats-vote 
curve and the symmetrically inverted seats-votes curve.  These 
measures are applied to recent Pennsylvania congressional 
elections and to abstract models of the seats-votes curves. The 
numerical values obtained from the various measures of bias are 
compared and contrasted. Each bias measure has merits for 
different seats-votes curves and for different elections, but 
all essentially agree for most cases when applied to measure 
only partisan bias, not conflated with competitiveness. This 
supports the inclusion of partisan fairness as a fundamental 
element for election law reform, and some options are discussed. 
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I.  Introduction  
It is well recognized, in the popular press, in public 
opinion, and in the academic literature, that gerrymandering has 
been heavily practiced in redistricting, and that this is one of 
the likely factors in the widely perceived dysfunction of the 
federal government and some state governments (Mann and Ornstein 
2013). While reform has occurred, notably in California and 
Iowa, reform should be considered in many other states, and it 
is therefore pertinent to consider what such reform should 
accomplish. Does it suffice that the redistricting process be 
apolitical, not involving legislators whose interests are 
clearly at stake?  Does it suffice that single member districts 
be compact and that political subdivisions be minimally 
subdivided?  Is it important that minorities and communities of 
interest obtain districts likely to elect their representatives?     
In this paper, it is assumed that partisan fairness should be 
a primary outcome of redistricting. Conventional redistricting 
criteria, such as compactness and respect for political 
subdivisions, even when used by non-partisan map makers, may 
nevertheless result in political bias via unintentional 
gerrymandering (Grofman and King 2007,Chen and Rodden 2013). 
Since these criteria do not appear to suffice to bring about 
partisan fairness, then reform legislation should aim to create 
a process that does produce it.1  As modern computation allows 
the generation of many districting maps, reform could constrain 
the permissible pool to those that have acceptably limited 
                                                             
1 This paper works within the confines of single member districts 
mandated by Congress for congressional districts, noting in passing 
that much partisan bias could be relieved by alternative voting 
systems (Amy 2000). 
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political bias.2   Of course, the prerequisite to this kind of 
reform is being able to measure partisan bias.  That is the 
primary subject of this paper. 
Of course, measuring partisan bias is also important for 
courts to decide cases of gerrymandered districting. Although 
gerrymandering is not justiciable in the opinions of many 
judges, other judges have written otherwise, but often with the 
reservation that a definitive measure of bias is lacking. The 
history has been thoroughly discussed (Grofman and King 2007). 
While the courts are important last resorts, partisan fairness 
legislation would be more expeditious, avoiding having to wait 
for an election and the subsequent time for a case to be decided 
and then wend its way through appeals. However, in the event 
that districting is challenged, either on partisan bias grounds 
or on other grounds, legislative mandating of partisan fairness 
would require courts to accept it as justiciable.  Furthermore, 
legislative guidelines for an unacceptable degree of partisan 
bias would also facilitate court decisions by reducing the 
burden of courts having to construct their own criteria de novo. 
Partisan fairness is sometimes conflated with the concept of 
competitiveness, aka responsiveness or representation.  However, 
it has been appropriately stressed that these are separate 
concepts with separate measures (King and Browning 1987).  One 
major difference between these concepts regards how to frame 
                                                             
2 McDonald 2007. As an example, Chen and Rodden 2013 generated many 
maps for Florida. Although the ostensible main theme of their paper 
was that political geography creates political bias, there were many 
maps that predicted less political bias than the average randomly 
generated map, so reform could constrain the allowed pool to those.  
Mattingly and Vaughn 2014 have recently provided another notable 
example of generating many compactness constrained maps for North 
Carolina; noting how far the map used in 2012 deviated from the mean 
bias in their generated pool, they call for a constrained pool.   
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their respective criteria quantitatively.  Obviously, the 
quantifiable criterion for partisan fairness is simply to 
minimize partisan bias, whereas maximizing competitiveness is 
not so obviously a good criterion (Hirsh and Ortiz 2005, Buchler 
2011). Although such considerations motivate focusing primarily 
on partisan fairness, quantifiable competitiveness criteria do 
emerge from some measures of partisan bias (McGhee 2014), so 
competitiveness/responsiveness will not be ignored.    
The simplest diagnostic, frequently mentioned as evidence of 
partisan bias, is to compare the fraction of votes won by a 
party with the fraction of seats won.  This is a very strong 
diagnostic of bias when the fraction of votes won exceeds half 
but the fraction of seats won is less than half.  However, this 
diagnostic is insufficient to indicate partisan bias when 
fractions of votes and seats are both less than half.  For 
example, there is not necessarily partisan bias if a party wins 
40% of the votes and only 20% of the seats.  This could indeed 
be a fair outcome when many seats are highly competitive, and it 
conforms to the so-called “cube law” (Kendall and Stuart 1950). 
In the limit of all seats being totally competitive, the 
expected outcome is zero seats for a party that wins 1% fewer 
votes than its opponent; this is the winner takes all extreme of 
competitiveness.  The assumption that the fraction of seats 
should equal the fraction of votes assumes that proportional 
representation is the ideal, and that is highly arguable (King 
1989), especially as it does not allow higher levels of 
competitiveness. As this simple diagnostic of partisan bias is 
incomplete at best and also difficult to quantify generally, it 
is appropriate to consider more complex measures.  Let it be 
 6 
emphasized, however, that even this simple diagnostic measure 
remains powerfully persuasive.3  
Having different measures of partisan bias is somewhat 
similar to having different measures of compactness.  Although 
it would be convenient if there were a single, obviously 
superior and universally accepted measure for any redistricting 
criterion, complex social problems often do not yield to simple 
solutions. In the case of compactness, a reasonable course has 
been to employ different measures and compare the results.  Such 
a practice can also be envisioned for measuring partisan bias 
and the comparisons in this paper may help to promote that.  
However, a conclusion of this paper is that there are several 
measures that essentially agree, so having different measures 
should not block the inclusion of partisan bias in election 
reform. 
In the next section, the well-known seats/votes (S/V) graph 
is reviewed as this has been a much used construct for 
quantitative discussion of partisan bias. Examples are given 
that will be used in subsequent sections to evaluate and compare 
measures of partisan bias; these include simple models. Also 
included is an apparently new way to construct the S/V graph 
that is applied to the 2011 Pennsylvania congressional 
redistricting.  In section III, those examples are used to 
elaborate further the defect in the simple diagnostic of bias 
and its corresponding measure that will be designated BS, where 
the subscript S refers to simple. Also, a much used variant, BGK, 
is reviewed.  A new quantitative measure of bias, BG, is proposed 
in Section IV; it follows naturally from asymmetry in S/V 
                                                             
3 As emphasized by Baker 1990. Note that there have been many other 
proposed measures of partisan bias. Eight different measures were 
discussed by Grofman 1983. 
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graphs, being zero when the graph is symmetric.  Section V 
discusses several additional measures of bias that are based, in 
several different ways, on partisan happiness/dissatisfaction.  
These measures differ from the other measures in that they each 
lead to an ideal S/V graph and an ideal competitiveness; the BL 
measure, based on lost votes, leads back to proportionality and 
the BW measure, based on wasted votes, leads to a more 
competitive S/V graph (McGhee 2014).  Section VI focuses on 
comparing the different B measures and a more general discussion 
ensues in Section VII. An Appendix presents the derivation of 
the way that S/V curves can be obtained from election results. 
 
II.  Seats/Votes (S/V) and rank/votes (r/v) graphs 
As is well known, S/V graphs plot the predicted number of 
seats S versus the statewide percentage of votes V won for all 
districts combined. Let us begin by reviewing the bilogit family 
of model S/V curves.  This family has been historically 
important because it emphasizes the distinction between partisan 
bias and competitiveness by embedding two independent 
parameters, λ for bias and ρ for competitiveness (King and 
Browning 1987).  Fig. 1 shows some members of this family. The 
straight line for λ=0 and ρ=1 is the proportional S/V curve where 
the percentage of seats equals the percentage of the statewide 
vote.  The (λ,ρ)=(0,3) curve is like the so-called cubic law; it 
is more responsive than proportionality, having a larger slope 
of 3 at V=50%, whereas the less responsive (0,0.5) curve has a 
smaller slope of 0.5. All curves with zero bias, λ = 0,  have S=50% 
at V=50%, but this changes with non-zero bias.  Positive values 
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of λ make S less than 50% when V = 50%, and by the same amount 
independently of the value of ρ. 
 
 
 
Figure 1:  Bilogit 
S/V curves for 
several combinations 
of bias λ and 
responsiveness/compe
titiveness ρ. 
 
 
 
 
While the literature clearly recognizes the importance of 
S/V graphs, there has been much appropriate discussion about how 
to construct them. Of course, to evaluate new plans before the 
first election, prior election returns and/or registration data 
by voter tabulation district (VTD) would be used.4    
Our next example is an S/V graph for the 2011 Pennsylvania 
congressional districting. It is constructed using 2012 election 
returns.5  The first step obtained a rank/vote (r/v) curve.  To 
see how this was constructed, look first at the left hand red 
axis of Fig. 2. The districts are rank ordered from lowest % 
                                                             
4 Backstrom, et al. 1990 advocate using election returns for a low-
profile statewide base race.    
5 There were only a few 3rd party candidates and those votes were pro-
rated into the percentages shown. 
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Republican (R) vote to highest. The R vote for each district is 
shown on the upper horizontal axis. Only the 12th district had a 
close vote; it is 6th in the rank order and was won by the 
Republican with 51.8% of the vote. The blue circle at 50.75% 
indicates the percentage of the statewide Democratic (D) vote.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2:  The red squares show the percentage Republican vote, 
ranked by district, in the 2012 PA congressional election. A 
uniform shift of 0.75% gives the Rank/Vote (r/v) curve shown 
as the stepped red line. The blue curve is a Seats/Votes (S/V) 
curve with predicted number of Democratic seats on the right 
hand axis versus the statewide percentage of Democratic votes 
on the horizontal axis. The calculation used shifts in each 
district proportional to the number of people in the party 
that must be shifted for the statewide vote to shift.  The 
dash-dot grey curve is a direct bilogit fit to the S/V curve 
and the dashed grey line is the maximum likelihood bilogit 
approximation to the election data.  The small numbers next to 
the red squares identify the PA districts. 
If the statewide vote had been 50% for both parties, and if 
a uniform shift of 0.75% is made in each district, the red 
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squares in Fig. 2 would be shifted right to the corners of the 
red line.  That line is often taken to be the S/V curve where 
the number of Democratic seats S would be given on the right 
hand axis for the statewide Democratic vote V on the lower 
horizontal axis.  However, this is not a valid S/V curve because 
it assumes that a uniform statewide swing of 40% to the 
Republicans would be required before they win all the seats, the 
last one being the one that had voted 90% Democratic in 2012. 
Such a uniform shift in all districts leads to the impossibility 
of requiring more than 100% Republicans in five of the 
districts.6 The uniform shift assumption is quite unrealistic on 
its face because it assumes that the same number of D’s would 
shift in districts with few D’s as in districts with many D’s.  
A much more realistic model for obtaining an S/V curve from 
r/v data7 is that a statewide percentage shift is equally likely 
to apply to any voter in any district; this is plausible and it 
has the merit that it does not allow the percentage of voters of 
either party in any district to fall below 0% or above 100% for 
any statewide vote shift. Simple math given in the Appendix8 
shows that any district, identified by subscript n, currently 
won by a party with vn percent of the district vote and V percent 
statewide vote will be lost when the statewide vote falls to 
V/2vn. This leads to the S/V curve for PA shown in Fig. 2. Even 
                                                             
6 The uniform shift construction of S/V curves has been appropriately 
criticized by many, particularly King 1989.   
7 Note that the S and the V have quite different meanings in the S/V 
curve, for which S is the number of expected Democratic seats S and V 
is the statewide Democratic vote V, than the r and v in the r/v curve, 
for which the r is the rank order of Republican vote and v is the 
district level R vote percentage. 
8 This appendix includes examples that illustrate the method and that 
also supplement the examples in this section. 
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if a district has 100% D vote when the statewide D vote is 50%, 
that seat would be lost when the statewide vote falls to 25%.  
There is little difference between the S/V and the r/v 
curves for the central region where 40% < V < 60%.  In either 
case Fig. 2 predicts that Democrats would have to obtain 58% of 
the statewide vote to obtain half the seats. (Assuming that the 
rank order remained the same, that would shift districts 12, 8, 
15 and 6 to the Democrats, but which particular district seats 
would shift is not part of an S/V curve prediction.) A swing to 
58% Democrats in PA would be a landslide swing. Supposing that 
the mean probability of normally distributed swings is as large 
as 5%, there would be less than 8% probability of Democrats 
getting 58% or more of the total vote, so Fig. 2 predicts that 
Democrats would have six or fewer seats 92% of the time with the 
current districts. Figure 2 also emphasizes that there is little 
responsiveness when the vote is in the 45-55% range. In the 2014 
midterm election, the overall congressional vote swung to 55% R, 
but there was no change in the number of party seats, nor in any 
of their districts. This S/V curve is even less responsive (less 
competitive) than proportionality; this is consistent with 
sweetheart bipartisan gerrymandering – incumbents of both 
parties like safe seats. 
Another way used here to obtain an S/V curve from the PA 
election data employed the maximum likelihood method of King 
1989. This method assumes that the underlying voting system is a 
member of the bilogit family.  Application of this method to the 
r/v district data in Fig. 2 gives the values (λ,ρ)=(0.32,2.3). 
 12 
Using these values gives the dashed grey bilogit curve shown in 
Fig. 2.9 
It will also be informative to consider simpler S/V graphs 
for comparing measures of bias. As is well known, the best way 
for a party to gain advantage is to pack opponent voters into a 
few districts while providing a comfortable winning margin of 
supporters in the majority of the remaining districts.  
Supposing an equal number of D and R voters, an R biased 
districting plan could pack 25% of the districts with 80% D 
while providing a comfortable 60% R in 75% of the districts.  
This gives the S/V graph shown by the solid line in Fig. 3.  The 
vertical jump in seats at V=60% resembles the PA S/V curve in 
Fig. 2.  Figure 3 also shows other members belonging to a family 
defined by having a 75% to 25% ratio of R to D at V=50%; the 
corresponding composition of D is (50+3x)% in 25% of the 
districts and (50-x)% in the other districts. Within this 
family, the parameter x is roughly related inversely to the 
responsiveness, as there would be more shift in seats with 
fluctuations in V when x is small. 
 
                                                             
9 Note that this curve is not the straightforward least squares fit to 
the S/V data points. That fit gives (λ,ρ)=(2.6,9.3) which is shown as 
the dash-dot grey line in Fig. 2. It is not surprising that the 
bilogits fail substantially.  All potential S/V curves consist of a 
non-zero fraction of all functions that increase monotonically with 
appropriate constraints on V at S=0 and the maximum S. Even if the S/V 
curve is only required to fit N discrete districts, the corresponding 
S/V family requires at least N-2 parameters as seen by considering 
just the finite Taylor series family consisting of N terms. Therefore, 
a possible S/V curve will not necessarily be well fit by the two 
parameter bilogit family when N>4. Rather more sophisticated methods 
to obtain S/V curves, at least for central ranges of V, have been 
proposed by Gelman and King 1994 and employed in the JudgeIt software 
Gelman, et al. 2012. 
 13 
 
 
Figure 3:  Members of a 
family of biased S/V 
curves that have only 
25% of the seats for 50% 
of the votes. A first 
vertical jump occurs at 
50-3x and a second 
vertical jump occurs at 
50+x where the legend 
gives the values of x 
for the three curves 
shown. 
 
 
 
III. Simple bias measure BS and the BGK variant 
 S/V curves suggest a simple measure of partisan bias, 
designated BS, based on the difference in the percentage of seats 
from 50% on the S/V curve when the statewide partisan vote V is 
50%. For example, in Fig. 1, for all the biased cases with a 
bias λ=1 against the party in question, the expected percentage 
of seats is 26.9% when the statewide vote is 50%, so the value 
of BS would be set to 50% - 23.1% = 26.9%. For Fig. 2 the 
expected number of seats is 5 and the total number of seats is 
18, so BS = (9-5)/18 which is a 22.2% bias in favor of the 
Republicans.  (Also, in Fig. 2, for the two bilogit curves, BS = 
7.9% and 42.2%, respectively.) In Fig. 3, BS = 25% for all cases.  
Table 1 lists the values of BS for all the S/V curves in Section 
II. As emphasized in the introduction, the BS measure is a 
persuasive indicator of partisan bias. 
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   Examples  λ ρ BS BGK BG  aBL   aBW 
1  Bilogits 0.5 3 12.3 11.9  7.9  14.2  4.0 
2  “           1.0 3 23.1 22.6 15.6  15.1  7.6 
3  “           0.5 8 12.3 10.3  3.1  20.3  8.1 
4  “           1.0 8 23.1 19.9  6.3  20.4  8.3 
5  “ maxL PA 0.32 2.3  7.9  7.8  6.3  11.3  4.0 
6  “ fit PA 2.6 9.3 42.2 39.4 13.9  22.1 10.2 
------------------------------------------------------- 
7 PA r/v NA NA 22.2 20.8 13.7  13.5 13.9 
8 PA S/V NA NA 17.8 17.6  9.4  17.1  5.3 
-------------------------------------------------------      
            x  
9  Fig.3    0 NA NA    0 0  0  25.0 12.5 
10   “   1 NA NA   25 0  2  24.1 11.6 
11 “   2 NA NA   25 2.5  4  23.1 10.6 
12 “      5 NA NA   25 25 10  20.3  8.1 
13 “  10 NA NA   25 25 20  16.3 10.1 
 
Table 1.  Rows 1-4 are bilogit S/V examples identified by the 
bias λ and the responsiveness ρ. The last five columns give 
percentage biases for the different bias measures defined in 
the text. Row 5 is the bilogit obtained from the PA r/v data 
using the maximum likelihood method and row 6 is the bilogit 
obtained by directly fitting to the PA S/V curve.  Rows 7 and 
8 are the r/v and S/V curves obtained from the PA 2012 
congressional election. Rows 9-13 are for the models in Fig. 3 
for the parameter values of x given in the x column. 
 
 Upon reflection, however, there is something that can go 
wrong with the BS measure.  This is best illustrated by the 
examples in Fig. 3. There is definitely a bias for the x=10 case 
because shifts as large as 10% are rare.  But by comparison, 
there is clearly less bias for the x=2 case because shifts 
exceeding 2% in the positive direction would give all the seats 
to the biased-against party while a 2% shift in the negative 
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direction would not change the number of seats. As the 
probability of shifts can be assumed to be the same in both 
directions, this means that the effective bias is smaller than 
for the x=10% case. Indeed, partisan districters would be 
unlikely to regard the x=2% case as desirable and would be more 
likely to aim for a smaller percentage of the seats than risk 
losing all the seats (Owen and Grofman 1988). Note that the true 
bias is zero when x=0 because this is just the winner take all 
graph that treats both parties identically. The true bias should 
therefore decrease to 0 as x decreases to zero and it should do 
so gradually, contrary to the BS measure. 
 The same conclusion may be drawn from Fig. 1 for the 
bilogit family. In that case compare the (λ,ρ)=(1,3)curve with 
the (λ,ρ)=(1,8) curve. As noted before, both curves have the same 
value of BS, but the argument in the previous paragraph implies 
that the curve with ρ = 8 should have less bias. Even when the 
bias λ is not zero, in the limit of infinite ρ the bilogit curve 
becomes a vertical step at V=50%, which is the unbiased, totally 
competitive, winner-take-all case. This further implies that the 
putative bias parameter λ is not proportional to the true bias – 
something that we will come back to in the next section.  
 To overcome this deficiency in the BS measure, Gelman and 
King 1994 and Gelman and King 1990 have used a modified bias, to 
be designated here as BGK; this first calculates the average 
number of seats from S(V) in the 45-55% V interval before 
performing the same BS calculation.  Values of BGK are also shown 
in Table 1. One concern about this measure is the arbitrariness 
of choosing a 45%-55% interval rather than some other interval, 
like 47%-53%. 
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IV.  Geometrical measure of bias; BG 
 Symmetry has been well recognized as indicating an absence 
of bias in that if one party gets 50+x% of the seats with 50+y% 
of the votes, then so should the other party.10  Correspondingly, 
symmetry in an S/V curve means that if there is a point on the 
curve at 50+x% of the seats and 50+y% of the votes, then there 
is another point on the curve at 50-x% of the seats and 50-y% of 
the votes.  This is called inversion symmetry about the (50,50) 
midpoint of the S/V graphical space. Clearly all the solid lines 
in Fig. 1 are symmetric, whereas none of the others are in Fig. 
1 nor are any of the others in Figs. 2 and 3.   
While the symmetry test diagnoses whether there is bias, 
one needs to actually measure it. We show in this section how to 
quantitatively measure the asymmetry in S/V curves 
geometrically.  Our procedure is to first invert the original 
S/V curve. This maps each (S,V) point on the original S/V curve 
into a point at (100-S,100-V).  For example, Fig. 4 shows two 
bilogit S/V curves and their inversions.11 Then, we propose that 
bias can be measured as the geometric area between an S/V curve 
and its inversion.  We further divide by the total number of 
seats so bias is given as a percentage, thereby giving a 
                                                             
10 The ratio of y to x is a measure of responsiveness. The limit for 
small x gives the derivative in the S/V curve at V=50%. The bilogit ρ 
gives exactly this value when λ is zero and ρ is only 30% larger when λ 
= 1.  
 
11 If the original bilogit curve has parameters (λ,ρ), then the inverted 
curve is a bilogit curve with parameters (-λ,ρ) so the original bias 
has been reversed from one party to the other.  This is a general 
feature of all inverted S/V curves. 
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normalized value appropriate for comparing different states with 
different numbers of seats.   
 
 
Figure 4:  Inversion of 
bilogit S/V curves. The two 
solid lines are inverses of 
each other as are the two 
dashed lines.  The shaded 
area between the two dashed 
lines illustrates the 
proposed BG measure of bias 
for the pair with dashed 
lines. The BG bias is 6.3% 
for this pair and 15.6% for 
the pair with solid lines. 
 
 
 
Figure 5 illustrates the method for obtaining BG from the 
S/V curve for PA shown in Fig. 2.12 Figure 6 shows the area of 
bias for one of the curves in Fig. 3.  Values of BG are tabulated 
in Table 1.   
 
 
 
                                                             
12 The computation is very simple.  The %vote in the S/V Democratic data 
for seat number s is reassigned to seat number 18-s to obtain the S/V 
Republican curve. To obtain BG in a spreadsheet, one just reverses the 
order of the votes column, subtracts from 100%, calculates the 
difference in the two columns, sums the absolute values, and averages. 
When this procedure is applied to an r/v curve, it should first be 
uniformly shifted to statewide v=50%. 
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Figure 5:  The S/V curve 
for Democrats is shown 
by blue squares, from 
Fig. 2. The red circles 
show the inverted S/V 
curve, which is the S/V 
curve for Republicans. 
The BG measure of bias is 
the shaded area between 
the two curves. It is 
computed to be 9.4% from 
the average of the 
length of the horizontal 
black lines. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6:  The solid blue 
line shows the S/V curve 
for the simple model in 
Fig. 3 with x=10.  The 
dashed red line is the 
inverted curve and the 
shaded area is the BG 
bias which equals 20%.  
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V.  Measures based on partisan satisfaction (BL,BW,BF)  
 The previous two sections focused on measures based on the 
S/V graph. This section considers a somewhat different approach. 
 As voters are happier when their candidate wins, this 
suggests that maximizing the total number of winning voters or 
minimizing the total number of losing voters would be a 
desirable feature of a voting system.  However, this would lead 
to deliberate polarization by placing all like-minded voters in 
the same districts.  In the limit where contiguity and 
compactness could be ignored, idealizing voter happiness would 
create districts that would be 100% likely to vote one way, so 
this would be a very unresponsive system, requiring an enormous 
swing in votes to alter the percentage of seats away from the 
one used in the last districting. Most reformers consider the 
lack of competitiveness undesirable, although the opposite view 
has been persuasively argued by Buchler 2011, who notes that 
maximizing happiness is one of the many arguments that support 
his position. If 100% packing could be assured, this system 
would be proportionately representative, but it fails in other 
cases. For example, if V=60% and the maximum attainable packing 
is 60%, then each district would have to be 60/40 and the 
majority party would likely win all the seats. While this is 
fair in that the opposite occurs when V=40%, it certainly 
decreases the average happiness of minority voters. As this is 
not desirable, and as packing like-minded voters is 
geographically conflicted, and as such a system is so 
unresponsive to changes in statewide voter preference until a 
subsequent redistricting, let us not further pursue total voter 
happiness as a goal for districting. 
Nevertheless, the basic idea that a system should deal with 
voter happiness is appealing and leads to interesting measures 
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of bias.  The difference, compared to maximizing total voter 
happiness, is to use the concept in ways that directly address 
partisan symmetry. First, let us consider equalizing the 
statewide percentage of unhappy, losing voters, LD and LR, in the 
D and R parties, respectively. The corresponding bias is then BL 
= LD - LR.  Interestingly, making BL zero for all values of the 
statewide vote VD leads to the proportional representation S/V 
curve. This is sufficiently important that a mathematical proof 
follows: 
Let vn be the percentage D vote in district n.  Then LD is 
the sum of vn over all districts n such that vn is less than 
50%. Similarly, LR is the sum of (100 – vn) over all 
districts n such that vn is greater than 50%. The difference 
BL = LD - LR is the sum of vn over all districts minus 100 
times the number of districts won by D.  The first number is 
just N times the percentage vote VD, where N is the number of 
districts. The second number is just N times the percentage 
seats SD, so BL = VD – SD. Therefore, setting BL to zero gives 
the proportional S/V curve S(V) = V.13 Q.E.D. 
The BL measure finds bias in any deviation from proportional 
voting. Given an S/V curve, or even just the result of a single 
election, BL is just V – S, which is the same as the simple BS 
measure when V = 50%.14 
                                                             
13 Of course, to compare BL for different numbers of districts, one 
divides by N so that both S and V are represented by percentages.   
14 As equalizing losing votes leads to the popular, proportional 
representation, S/V curve, one might also ask what one is led to by 
equalizing winning votes. The same kind of analysis shows that setting 
the corresponding bias of winning votes to zero leads to S(V) + V = 
100% which would idealize a bizarre S/V curve that would require a 
party to lose seats as it gains votes. 
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 There is an important variant of the lost votes bias BL that 
instead minimizes the difference in so-called “wasted” votes 
(McGhee 2014). Wasted Democratic votes WD consist of the sum over 
all districts of the lost votes LD and the surplus or excess 
votes ED, where ED is defined as the winning vote percentage in 
excess of 50%. A rationale for including excess votes is that 
they specifically focus on packing.  As shown by McGhee 2014, 
equalizing WD and WR also leads to a particular S/V curve, 
namely, S = 2V - 50% when 25%<V<75%, S = 0 when V<25% and S = 1 
when V>75%. This curve is shown by the dashed red line in Fig. 
7.  As the slope of this curve is 2 in the midrange of V, it is 
more responsive than proportionality and it is more realistic 
for the extreme values of V.15 Let us designate the corresponding 
wasted votes measure of bias BW as WD – WR.  This is easily 
calculated as BW = 2V – S – 50%.  When V=50%, similarly to BL, BW 
is the same as the simple measure BS. 
One important feature of both the BL and the BW measures is 
that they generally have different values for different V. For 
example, supposing that the shifted r/v curve in Fig. 7 is the 
S/V curve, BL and BW are the vertical seat differences between 
the blue curve and the ideal BL=0 and BW=0 curves, respectively. 
Accordingly, in Fig. 7 BL indicates bias against the Democrats 
when statewide vote V is less than 60% but shifts to bias 
against the Republicans when V exceeds 60%.  While this shifting 
complicates these measures, it also allows them to adapt when 
statewide votes differ considerably from 50%, as will be further 
discussed later.  One way to obtain a different single number 
                                                             
15 If there are 100 seats, to obtain proportionality with 1% of the 
vote requires having at least half of the party’s voters in one 
district. Generally, the slope of S/V curves must not exceed 2 when 
V=0.  The bilogit S/V curves violate this constraint when ρ is less 
than 1.  
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for these measures that is not fixated at V=50% is to average 
them over all V.  Figure 7 shows a geometric representation of 
such an average.  These average values for the S/V curves in 
Section II are what are tabulated in Table 1 under the names aBL 
and aBW to distinguish those numbers from the V=50% values which 
are the same as the BS values. 
Figure 7: The PA uniform 
shift r/v curve compared to 
the solid black 
proportionality line.  The 
shaded difference is the 
average aBL bias of the PA 
curve.  Also shown as the 
dashed red line is the ideal 
BW = 0 S/V curve. The area 
between it and the PA curve 
(not shown) is the average 
aBW for PA. The dot-dash BF 
= 0 curve locates S/V 
coordinates when all the 
winning minority districts 
receive 50+% of the vote. BF 
= 0 can be achieved in the 
region between the green 
dash-dot line and the 
proportional representation 
line.  
 
Our last measure of bias returns to equalizing happy voters 
in both parties.  Although equalizing the number of winning 
(“happy”) votes, HD = HR, did not work, as emphasized in footnote 
14, an appealing variation, at least a priori, is to equalize 
the fractions of happy voters; let us designate these fractions 
as FD and FR. These are defined as the statewide number of 
winning votes for a party divided by the total number of votes 
for that party, so FD = HD/V and FR = HR/(1-V) and the 
corresponding measure of bias will be designated by BF = FR - FD. 
The appealing feature is that an R voter and a D voter have the 
 23 
same probability of being happy when BF = 0. Interestingly, 
unlike the BL and BW measures, this one does not lead to a single 
ideal curve when BF = 0. Instead there are areas of the S/V plot 
where one can obtain BF = 0, as shown in Fig. 7. In principle, 
this allows some flexibility not allowed by the BL = 0 and the BW 
= 0 criteria, and it shares with those measures that it can be 
applied when V is not close to 50%. Unfortunately, it requires 
packing an unrealistically large fraction of the majority party 
voters when V is much different from 50%.  For example, for V = 
60%, the average fraction of majority voters in all its won 
districts must exceed 87%. Also, as Fig. 7 shows, the ideal BF = 
0 region indulges a deeply minority party by giving it at least 
as many seats as proportional representation; for example, 
constraining BF = 0, a districting plan for a state with ten 
districts would ideally design a highly competitive district 
that would be won by the minority party with only V = 5.3% of 
the projected vote while giving it 10% of the seats. 
   
VI. Comparison of measures of bias   
 Let us first compare the values of BS and BGK in Table 1.  
For the bilogits and the PA S/V curves, there is not much 
difference because all those curves are rather smooth near 
V=50%, although the difference becomes larger for the larger 
values of the responsiveness ρ. Both measures track the bias λ 
used to construct the bilogit curves when a normalization factor 
of about 25% is applied to λ to convert it to a percentage scale.   
For the S/V curves in Fig. 3, BGK performs somewhat better 
than BS in that it assigns less bias to the x=2 example.  It does 
exhibit an artificial characteristic in that it remains 0 for 
all x<5/3 and stays at the maximum 25% for x>5%.  This 
artificial piecewise behavior is caused by using an average 
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confined to the V interval (45%,55%). This could easily be 
improved by using a normally distributed weighted average 
instead of a uniform weight requiring cutoffs that have to be 
arbitrarily chosen, such as at 45% and 55%.16 
 Table 1 shows that the new BG measure has the appropriate 
feature of increasing smoothly as x increases for the S/V curves 
in Fig. 3. Concomitantly, for the bilogit S/V curves, the ratio 
of BG for different values of responsiveness ρ differs 
dramatically from the BS, BGK and λ measures, varying from about 
2/3 for ρ = 3 to about 1/4 for ρ = 8. If one were to accept the 
BG measure as the best one, this would suggest that the 
bias  characterizing the bilogit family be designated as λ/ρ 
rather than λ.  
Geometrically, the difference between BS, BGK and BG is the 
width of the area between the S/V plot and its inverse used in 
the respective calculations or the different measures of bias.  
BG uses all that area, BGK uses only the portion between 45% and 
55% of the vote, and BS uses only an infinitely narrow strip at 
V=50%. An argument in favor of BG is that it directly uses the 
highly packed districts in Fig. 2, not just the few districts 
near V=50%.17   
                                                             
16 Something equivalent appears to be embedded in JudgeIt (Gelman, et 
al. 2012) in that the S/V curve is calculated with statistical 
uncertainty. 
17 Another way to measure bias, designated here as BDK, slices the S/V 
graph in the horizontal direction at the median 50% seat level and 
measures the the deviation from 50% vote (Singer 2015). Compared to 
the BS measure that slices the S/V graph in the vertical direction, BDK 
accurately treats our examples in Fig. 3. However, like the BS measure, 
it also may suffer in certain cases by taking too small a slice. For 
example, suppose half the districts have 50% R, 1/3 have 65% R and 1/6 
have 20% R, so the statewide vote is 50% and the median seat also has 
50% vote. Then, BDK would be zero whereas the expectation is for R to 
obtain 58% of the seats.  It may be noted that the BG measure does not 
 25 
As has been emphasized previously, the losing votes bias BL 
and the wasted votes bias BW have the same values as BS when 
V=50%. Since BL and BW generally vary with statewide vote V, 
Table 1 also shows values for their averages, aBL and aBW.  For 
the bilogit family, aBL is zero for proportional λ=0, ρ=1 
representation, and it increases strongly as the responsiveness 
ρ deviates from 1. This increase is disconcertingly stronger than 
with changes in λ. This pattern holds for the Fig. 3 models 
because 1/x is the surrogate responsiveness, suggesting that aBL 
is not a good measure of bias.  The pattern for aBW is more 
complex because its ideal responsiveness is greater than 
proportional.  aBW is generally smaller than aBL for the examples 
in Table 1 because those examples have responsiveness greater 
than proportionality ρ = 1. It also does not appear to be a good 
measure of bias.18 
The near agreement of aBW, aBL and BG for the PA S/V is not 
especially meaningful in view of the considerations in the 
preceding paragraph. Of somewhat greater interest in Table 1 is 
the comparison of bias for the three different PA S/V curves.  
The bilogit curve that is derived by maximizing statistical 
likelihood and the bilogit curve that is simply fit to the 
uniform shift S/V curve are shown in Fig. 2.  These two bilogits 
are substantially different from each other and from the PA S/V 
and that is reflected by all the measures of bias in Table 1. 
This suggests that bilogits should not be used to evaluate real 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
slice the S/V plot in either direction but measures the entire area 
that involves both directions. 
 
18 Note that this does not imply rejection of the BL and BW measures, 
only the aBL and aBW measures.  
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districting plans.  Nevertheless, they are useful models for 
comparing measures of bias.  
One aspect of comparing the different measures that is not 
adequately contained in Table 1 is the apparent advantage the BL, 
BW and BF measures have when the statewide vote deviates 
substantially from V = 50%.  For example, a party with V = 70% 
could obtain all the seats if it can obtain a bilogit S/V curve 
with λ = 0 and ρ = 8.19 This is a perfectly symmetrical curve that 
has no bias, but the high responsiveness, approaching the 
winner-take-all curve, gives 99.9% of the seats to the majority 
party at V=70%.20 Minimizing the lost votes bias BL, by achieving 
proportionality, would seem fairer, but this becomes difficult 
to implement when V increases further. As noted before, a 
similar problem arises for BF. This problem is avoided by 
choosing instead to minimize the wasted votes bias BW and this 
has the advantage to those concerned more with competitiveness 
of being more responsive to swings in the statewide vote. 
However, this measure would freeze out parties that have less 
than 25% of the vote. While these are very real considerations, 
it must be emphasized that these issues are concerned with 
competitiveness/responsiveness, not partisan bias. For partisan 
bias, the BL and BW measures should be applied only to the V = 
50% point on the S/V curve, at which they agree with the simple 
BS measure. From this point of view, applying the BL or BW 
measures when V is not equal to 50% attempts to do too much in 
addition to assessing partisan bias. 
It may finally be noted that Table 1 does not contain 
values of BF because it is not possible to calculate it for the 
                                                             
19 This curve is halfway between the two ρ = 8 curves in Fig. 4. 
20 Something like this might account for Maryland having no Republicans 
in Congress. 
 27 
bilogits or for the Fig. 3 curves because those are only S/V 
curves without detailed voter information. It is easy to 
calculate BF from the PA data in Fig. 2. For that election only 
45% of the D voters voted for a winning candidate while 87% of 
the R voters did. Subtracting these yields a bias BF = 45% 
favoring the Republicans.  In percentage terms, this is the most 
sensitive measure of bias for PA.21  
Let us also compare how measures of bias change when using 
the uniformly shifted PA r/v curve instead of the S/V curve. 
This is of interest because r/v curves are directly produced 
from data, whereas the S/V curve requires a model and a layer of 
intervening manipulation.  Discounting the aBL and aBW measures 
for the reasons discussed above, Table 1 shows that only 
modestly larger values for the BS, BGK, and BG measures of bias 
are obtained for the r/v curve.22 This suggests that measures of 
bias could be based on r/v curves, but it must be emphasized 
that this is only valid if the r/v curve is first shifted to 
v=50% statewide vote as is emphasized in Fig. 9 in the Appendix; 
that is a manipulation that is not made when constructing the 
S/V curve, albeit a simpler one than those that are used in 
constructing S/V curves.    
  
                                                             
21 One might prefer to describe these results by saying that twice as 
many R voters in PA were happy with their representative sent to 
Congress as were D voters. It may also be noted that these values were 
computed from the r/v data with no uniform shift.  They change only by 
about 0.2% when the uniform shift was applied because no seats 
shifted. However, as uniform shift is increased, seats shift and BF 
decreases. An 8% shift would flip 5 seats (giving a Democratic 
majority of 10 to 8) and then BF reverses sign and becomes an 8% bias 
favoring Democrats.  
22 The ratio for BG is largest as it gives more emphasis to districts won 
by large percentages and those are most affected by the S/V model 
calculation. 
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VII. Discussion 
 There are several aspects regarding inclusion of partisan 
fairness in the law. The first aspect distinguishes between 
making it justiciable, in order to challenge blatantly biased 
districting plans on the one hand and, on the other hand, 
including it in legislation and/or state constitutional 
amendments in order to avoid having biased plans in the first 
place. In either case, conciseness would be helpful. As Grofman 
and King 2007 have focused on the judiciary, this discussion 
concentrates on legislation.  Of course, to reform existing 
election law, it is most important that partisan bias simply be 
recognized as a restrictive criterion in state constitutions. 
This could be done just with a phrase in a constitutional 
amendment. Unfortunately, that could allow it to be practically 
disregarded just as compactness has been largely disregarded in 
the past, so something more might be contemplated. Reform could 
also come through legislative statute; that has the advantage of 
being easier to change as conditions change, but also easier to 
weaken for partisan advantage. Reform could also come through an 
independent districting commission. Such a commission would 
likely be more inclined to include partisan fairness in its 
deliberations if there is at least a phrase in the constitution 
mandating it, and it would be largely prohibited from doing so 
if political data, like election returns or voter registration, 
were constitutionally forbidden, as some reformers advocate.23 An 
independent commission might also find it helpful if a clear set 
of guidelines is worked out by scholars. 
                                                             
23 However, it may be noted that Belin, et al. 2011 propose an 
interesting way to promote partisan fairness that does not require 
political data, only population density data. 
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The second aspect regards how measures of bias should be 
applied. In their important paper Grofman and King 2007 discuss 
five possibilities: (1) “Require plans with as little partisan 
bias as practicable”, (2) “Disqualify plans with partisan bias 
that deviate from symmetry by at least one seat”, (3) 
“Disqualify only those plans with egregious levels of partisan 
bias (defined in terms of a specified percentage threshold)”, 
(4) “Disqualify only those plans that (can be expected to) 
translate a minority of the votes into a majority of the seats”, 
(5) “Disqualify only those plans whose partisan bias is both 
severe and greater than that in the plan being replaced.” 
Although Grofman and King 2007 discussed these in the context of 
justiciability, these are also possibilities for the legislative 
approach. All except number (4) require a quantifiable measure 
of bias. Possibilities (2) and (3) also address a third aspect, 
namely, how much partisan bias should be allowed.  
   The fourth aspect of including partisan fairness regards 
measures of bias to be used.24 That has been the focus of this 
paper, and several different measures have been presented and 
compared to each other. Recapitulating, when applied 
appropriately to the S/V or the shifted r/v curves, all the 
                                                             
24 Grofman and King 2007 essentially assume that bias would be measured 
using JudgeIt software (Gelman, et al. 2012). This would be a good 
choice, although it would probably be considered inappropriate to name 
it in legislation.  It may also be noted that JudgeIt is apparently 
not designed to reliably obtain the S/V curve over the full range of V 
from 0 to 100%, so it is incompatible with the BG measure. As mentioned 
at the end of Section VI, it might be simpler just to use the shifted 
election data for measuring partisan bias, and JudgeIt does seem to 
involve a uniform shift. Of course, JudgeIt is an invaluable 
statistical tool for measuring many other election elements and for 
including other kinds of data, especially incumbency. In this latter 
regard, it may also be noted that the new incumbent in the 12th PA 
district in 2014 received 3.8% more than the average R vote in 2014 
and 2.6% more in 2012, consistent with a 1.2% incumbency advantage 
based on a very small sample. 
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viable measures essentially agree.25 Apparent divergences that 
occur when the BL (proportional representation) and the BW 
(super-proportional representation) are applied to statewide 
votes that deviate considerably from 50% are due to these 
measures also attempting to establish a standard for 
competitiveness.  As noted in the introduction, that is not an 
easy issue; it should not impede going forward with the issue of 
partisan fairness. In the remainder of this section, the 
different bias measures will be discussed in relation to the 
other three aspects of inclusion of partisan fairness in the 
law. 
The simple BS measure has the merit that it can be more 
concisely stated than the others. That is an advantage when one 
considers that any measure of bias would already have to involve 
quite a lot of non-trivial language if it is to be spelled out 
in detail.  First, it would have to be stated what the measure 
would be applied to.  A guideline for a commission could give 
the choice between an S/V curve or a shifted r/v curve, 
emphasizing that the measure would be applied to V = 50% in 
either case. Legislative statute would most likely have to make 
the choice between S/V and r/v. Second, there is the 
consideration of what kind of data to use in drawing the S/V or 
r/v curve (see footnote 4), again with similar distinctions 
regarding legislation or redistricting commissions.  
Regarding the second aspect of how to apply a measure of 
bias for possibilities (1,2,3,5, listed above) of Grofman and 
King 2007, none of the viable measures is any less preferred 
than the others. Also regarding the third aspect of how much 
                                                             
25 We do not include the unviable aBL and the aBW measures. The BG 
measure can be made to agree better with the others if it is 
multiplied by a factor of 1.5. 
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bias to allow, the only distinction is that any percentage 
allowed by BG should be set smaller than the percentages allowed 
by BS, BGK, BL and BW, and the percentages for BF should be set 
higher.26 Possibility (2) of Grofman and King 2007 above requires 
that the allowable bias would be smaller for a body with more 
seats.  For PA with 18 congressional seats, it would constrain 
bias to 5.5% using the BS, BGK, BL and BW measures and to about 4% 
using the BG measure.27  
A final issue then is whether a percentage bias number 
should be embedded in the state constitution or whether it is 
best done by legislative statute. While reform would be more 
robust if it could be embedded in the constitution, the language 
to cover all the contingencies could be unwieldy and, to ensure 
passage, the bias range may be set too high and then not be easy 
to change.  This consideration favors possibility (1) above, but 
the clause “as practicable” could vitiate implementation if it 
were claimed that other factors make fairness not practicable. 
As usual, reform law would require political deliberation, but 
that should not dissuade reformers from pressing the issue of 
partisan fairness in election law. 
 
 
 
                                                             
26 Different levels for different measures is analogous to obtaining 
different numbers when measuring the same length with a meter stick or 
a yard stick, so this is not a valid criticism against the 
quantification of partisan bias. 
27 One concern could be that political geography would not allow any 
plans to fall in the allowed bias range. This occurred with the 
districts generated by Chen and Rodden 2013 for Florida. For PA that 
concern might be moot as it has been asserted that a districting plan 
has been made that would reverse the 2012 result, giving the Democrats 
13 seats if all voters would have voted for candidates of the same 
party (Leach 2014). 
 32 
Appendix: Construction of S/V curves from voting data.   
Given N districts, labeled n=1,…,N, and given Democratic (D) 
past (or projected) vote vnD in current (or proposed) district n, 
the statewide D vote is VD = (1/N)ΣvnD where Σ connotes the sum 
over all districts. First consider a statewide shift from D to R 
(Republicans) and denote the new statewide vote as VD’ = VD - δD, 
where δD is the average percentage of shifted Democrats 
statewide. We assume that there is an equal probability xD for 
any Democrat in any district to shift,28 so the new district vote 
is vnD’ = vnD(1-xD).  Summing vnD’ over all districts gives VD’ = VD 
- xDVD; this identifies xD = δD/VD. Then, the shift δnD in 
statewide vote that is necessary to shift a seat n that was won 
by the Democrats must satisfy vnD’ = 50% which gives δnD = + VD - 
VD/2vnD. Therefore, the statewide vote required to shift the nth 
seat from D to R is VnD’ = VD - δnD = VD/2vnD, as stated in the main 
text. This is the value of V that is plotted on the S/V curve 
for the nth seat originally won by the Democrats. For seats 
originally won by the Republicans, the same derivation gives the 
symmetrically equivalent formula VnR’ = VR/2vnR when the 
Republican vote vnR exceeds 50%. For those seats, the value of V 
that is plotted on the SD/VD curve for district n is, of course, 
100 – VnR’, corresponding to VnD’.    
 It may be of some interest to view some simple r/v examples 
and their corresponding S/V curves. Figure 8 shows that uniform 
distributions of the votes by ranked seats result in S/V curves 
that all have BS = 0. Uniform shifts of these r/v lines to V = 
                                                             
28 The model assumes that only Democrats shift when there is a 
statewide shift towards Republicans. Supposing that Republicans also 
shift with a uniform probability leads to the unreasonable result that 
a massively Republican district would always become more Democratic 
even when the statewide vote was shifting in favor of the Republicans.     
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50% (not shown) are all symmetrical. Slight asymmetry is evident 
for the two S/V examples derived from r/v curves with statewide 
vote different from 50%, so the BG measure is small but not zero, 
gradually reaching 5% as V increases to 75%.  
Figure 8.  Four simple r/v 
examples are shown by the 
dashed lines and the 
corresponding S/V curves 
are shown by solid lines 
of the same color.  For 
the r/v lines the votes 
axis is the vote for the 
first party for each 
ranked seat. For the S/V 
curves the votes are the 
statewide votes required 
for the second party to 
obtain the number of seats 
on the S/V curve. For the 
last example, the first 
party received 75% of the 
statewide vote, which is 
the average of the vote in 
100 districts starting 
with 50% for the seat won 
narrowly and moving up to 
the last seat which was 
won unanimously. All of 
these examples are 
unbiased using the BS 
measure.  
 
In contrast to Fig. 8, Fig. 9 shows an example of an 
asymmetrical r/v curve where the first party wins only 25% of 
the seats with 37.5% of the vote.  Nevertheless, this outcome is 
biased against the second party because the S/V curve shows that 
the second party would, on average, only win 38% of the seats 
when the statewide vote is 50% for a bias BS = 12%.  
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Figure 9.  A highly 
asymmetric r/v curve that 
gives 37.5% of the 
statewide vote to the 
first party is shown by 
the red dashed line. That 
party loses ranked seats 
1-50 and splits seats 51-
100. The green dash-dot 
line shows the shifted r/v 
curve to 50% statewide 
vote and the solid red 
curve shows the S/V curve 
computed from the 
unshifted r/v curve.  The 
S/V and the shifted r/v 
curves agree in the vote 
region centered around 
50%.    
 
 Finally, it may be of interest to view a comparison of the 
S/V curves for the 2014 and 2012 PA congressional elections.  
Fig. 10 shows that three uncontested seats moved the largest and 
smallest district vote percentages vn to more extreme values. 
More interestingly, it also appears that the “wall” of 
Republican seats built up near VD = 60% in 2012 may be moving 
into the more competitive range, even though those seats were 
comfortably held by the Republicans at the 60% district level in 
2014 due to a 5.5% statewide swing.  This would be consistent 
with studies that have reported gradual erosion in the effects 
of gerrymanders (McGhee 2014). This should not, of course, be 
used as an excuse to ignore gerrymandered partisan bias when 
redistricting, even if the effect only lasts for a few 
elections.  
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Figure 10.  Comparison 
of S/V curves for PA 
2012 and 2014 
Congressional elections. 
Three uncontested seats, 
one Democratic and two 
Republican, are at the 
ends of the 2014 curve. 
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